Optical TEMPEST by Loughry, Joe
Optical TEMPEST
Joe Loughry
University of Denver
Denver, Colorado 80208 USA
Email: joe.loughry@cs.du.edu
Abstract—Research on optical TEMPEST has moved forward
since 2002 when the first pair of papers on the subject emerged
independently and from widely separated locations in the world
within a week of each other. Since that time, vulnerabilities have
evolved along with systems, and several new threat vectors have
consequently appeared. Although the supply chain ecosystem
of Ethernet has reduced the vulnerability of billions of devices
through use of standardised PHY solutions, other recent trends
including the Internet of Things (IoT) in both industrial settings
and the general population, High Frequency Trading (HFT) in
the financial sector, the European General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR), and inexpensive drones have made it relevant
again for consideration in the design of new products for privacy.
One of the general principles of security is that vulnerabilities,
once fixed, sometimes do not stay that way.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the publication sixteen years ago of the first two
papers on optical TEMPEST, open source information on
security of compromising emanations—and side channels in
general—has exploded. Before the late 1990s, only a handful
of papers had been published in the open literature on the
subject of TEMPEST1 and the topic was mostly relegated
to the folklore of infosec; the only two scientific studies of
unintentional compromising emanations remained van Eck [2]
and Smulders [3] although Wright’s book around the same
time [4] described anecdotal reports dating back to the first
world war. But following Kocher’s seminal 1996 paper on
side channel attacks [5] and Kuhn & Anderson [6] having
shown—essentially by adding forward error correction to
EMC—that covert channels were not limited by the system
boundary, two papers appeared within a week of each other
on complementary aspects of optical emanations [7], [8]. Since
then, these two papers, between them, have been cited more
than 300 times.
A. Organisation
The first part of this paper is a brief review of the results
in the first paper on optical TEMPEST and a critique of
mistakes that were made by one of the first investigators of the
phenomenon, in the methodology, model building, writing, and
1TEMPEST, here, is the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) code
name for ‘the problem of compromising radiation’—radio frequency (RF)
or acoustic radiation, according to the original reference, which was only
declassified in 2007—including both exploitation and control [1]. Beyond the
1972 definition of TEMPEST, military and academic researchers have since
expanded the spectrum of interest to include DC, optical, thermal, magnetic,
and acceleration side channels.
follow-up of the earliest research. This is followed by a survey
of ways that later authors have repaired the damage. Finally,
a cautionary tale of the danger of forgetting lessons learnt in
security is rounded out by a description of some interesting
aspects of the design of a new information security product
with these principles in mind.
II. THE STORY I NEVER TOLD YOU BEFORE
Optical TEMPEST was discovered by one of the junior IT
people in a bank. In the raised-floor computer room on the
sixth floor of a high-rise glass building in downtown Seattle,
surrounded by other glass high-rises—their own computer
rooms visible at night by the reddish glow of Light Emitting
Diode (LED) indicators—I was working very late. Dial-up
modems had not yet gone completely extinct, 10Mbit s−1
Ethernet was increasingly common on PCs, and leased lines
ran everywhere from the computer room to branch offices—
thousands of them. This was the environment where optical
TEMPEST was discovered in 1992. After a few nights of data
gathering, I told my postgraduate professor at Seattle Uni-
versity, Dr David Umphress, about it. Cautious experiments
were performed. A literature survey was quietly done to see if
anyone had ever noticed it before, and the National Computer
Security Center (NCSC) was asked if they knew of it. All
inquiries ran into a classified information roadblock; just about
the only thing that was known for sure at the time, in the
open literature, was that nearly everything about TEMPEST
was classified (but the name was probably not an acronym).
A. What we found
Table I summarises the relevant experimental findings from
our 2002 paper [8]. In brief, we found that Class III devices
leaked all of the information processed by the device in
the form of optical emanations, and more than a third of
devices tested were of this type. LED status indicators are
both inexpensive & reliable—making them attractive to circuit
designers—and fast enough to respond to high-speed digital
signals, which is what makes them hazardous from an inform-
ation security perspective. Visual indicators only need to be
fast enough to communicate information to human eyes, but
LEDs are much faster. From an attacker’s perspective, the fact
that an LED turning on and off at a rate exceeding about
30Hz appears to human eyes to be lit steadily means that
information can be transmitted right past observers, the way
dogs can hear ultrasonic sounds inaudible to humans. This has
both accidental and intentional infosec implications.978-1-4673-9698-1/18/$31.00 c©2018 IEEE
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Table I
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE ORIGINAL OPTICAL TEMPEST
RESEARCH PAPER OF 2002 (ADAPTED FROM [8, TABLES I AND II]).
Class Correlated with Risk How many
I State of the device Low 10 percent (4)
II Activity Level Medium 54 percent (21)
III Data (content) High 36 percent (14)
Class III optical emanations were measured almost entirely
coming from data communication devices, ranging from low
cost to very high cost equipment. For reasons described in the
next section, Ethernet devices were mostly unaffected, though
we looked hard to find any that might be. We named the effect
‘optical TEMPEST’.
B. Missed opportunities
Around this time, I made a serious mistake. Unbeknown to
me, Markus Kuhn, a postgraduate student at Cambridge, was
working along similar lines [9]. I had thought about optical
emanations from video display screens but dismissed the idea
as physically impossible, without ever testing it. I was wrong. I
thought the decay time of Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) phosphors
was too slow to carry information about the video signal2 in
the diffuse light available to non-line-of-sight interception, and
consequently, I never looked for it.
Markus Kuhn found and successfully exploited a tiny ripple
near the peak of the response curve of CRT phosphors. The
gross shape of the curve belies the fact that that tiny ripple is
detectable in the time domain optical signal, if your detector
is fast enough.
Kuhn’s detector—a photomultiplier tube—was better than
mine; the gain–bandwidth product of a photomultiplier is
superior to that of the large-area photodiode/transimpedance
amplifier combination I used, but we were looking for different
things: Kuhn was looking for diffuse emanations from the
entire screen at once, and I was looking for for line-of-sight
photons from a particular LED on an isolated piece of equip-
ment (although we did eventually figure out how to separate
multiple superimposed signals from diffuse optical emanations
collected by non-line-of-sight means). The difference is that
Markus Kuhn actually looked, and he found an effect that I
missed.
C. Delay of first publication
Why didn’t we publish in the nineteen-nineties? Part of the
reason was perfectionism; I wanted to be able to explain the
phenomenon and make predictions, not only describe it. In
addition, by that time I had left the bank and was working
for a defence contractor on a classified project. I had a
2Speaking of video signals, laser printers intensity-modulate an infrared
laser with a video signal, and some plastics are transparent to infrared light. It
might be worthwhile to measure laser printers for information-bearing optical
emanations outside visible wavelengths, as Kubiak has done for RF [10]–[13],
Ulas¸ et al. have done for conducted powerline emanations [14], and Enev et
al. have done for conducted powerline emanations from video displays [15].
security clearance now, and a greatly expanded awareness of
counterintelligence sources and methods.
And so, following procedures, we submitted the paper to
NSA for approval to publish. It took a year and a half to
approve.3 Eventually, NSA wrote back and said, ‘approved for
public release’. I wonder what they spent all that time doing.
D. Roads not taken
Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices hadn’t happened yet,
but today they’re ubiquitous. Later and informal investigation
of some light-up USB cables—a fad that didn’t last—turned
up evidence of Class II optical emanations related to data
passing through the USB cable, but evidence for Class III
optical emanations remains inconclusive.
Considered narrowly outside the scope of optical TEM-
PEST, for the purpose of this paper, are line-of-sight attacks
that essentially reduce to direct or indirect imaging of the
display [16]–[21]. This is somewhat unfair, as the original
attack by Loughry & Umphress required, for the most part,
line-of-sight access—except, as previously mentioned, in §8.2
of our original paper—but in the time domain, not space.
Optical TEMPEST is a time domain effect. Other remote at-
tacks employing optical means, such as visual or interferomet-
ric measurement of keyboard or printer acoustic emanations
[22]–[25], or a highly novel reverse covert channel using a
document scanner [26], are outside the scope of this paper.
Screen burn-in, for example, is data remanence, not optical
TEMPEST [27]. Finally, induced optical emanations [28]–
[35] and [8, Appendix A] are properly considered out-of-band
covert channels [36]–[38], despite being compromising optical
emanations in the time domain, because they are purposely
induced by a nefarious software or hardware agent, or by
activity that is controllable by a third party, introduced into
the target system by the attacker. Control and remote sensing
of magnetic fields, or instantaneous electrical power demand,
similarly are a covert channel, not TEMPEST [39], [40].
III. MAC AND PHY
Of the potential optical signal sources available in a standard
office computer (power light, hard disk activity indicator,
keyboard LEDs, network interface link indicators, charging
indicators on laptops, optical disc read head and activity
indicators, scanners, motherboard LEDs, optical mouse, and,
of course, the screen), we looked hard, at the time, at the other
two large populations of blinking LEDs in the world: disk
activity lights4 and Network Interface Cards (NICs). Neither
source proved fruitful; we were unable to find any evidence
of Class III optical emanations from storage devices or link
3Actually, it didn’t quite happen that way. Our paper was approved for
publication very quickly, in only a few weeks; we submitted it to the 10th
USENIX Security Symposium where it was immediately accepted. A few
days later, NSA called us back, and in a panic, insisted that we withdraw the
paper from the conference. I had to apologise to the programme chair; it was
awfully embarrassing, and the delay in publishing was almost two years.
4Guri et al. finally made it work in 2017 by hovering a drone in the air
outside the building [30]; unlike data exfiltration using keyboard LEDs [41,
Chapter 90], the hard disk LED channel is covert, not clandestine.
activity indicators on Ethernet cards. The one exception—and
it was a bad one—was WAN interfaces on the back panel of
enterprise routers, devices which live in racks that sometimes
back up to windows; see [8, §4.3.1]. Aside from those, the
complete absence of compromising optical emanations from
Ethernet link activity LEDs is believed to be a consequence
of the fact that the Ethernet protocol is well divided into two
layers: MAC and PHY.
In the Ethernet protocol, the Media Access Control layer
(MAC) marshals bits into frames and hands them off to the
Physical layer (PHY), which deals exclusively with voltages
and waveforms and wires, or radio, or fibre optics. The MAC
talks to the PHY using a protocol called Media Independent
Interface (MII)—GMII for gigabit Ethernet—over a pair of 4-
bit-wide parallel channels (for sending and receiving) clocked
at 25MHz [42].
In the case of twisted pair wire, only a few suppliers
make PHY chips and generally they do it right, providing
dedicated pins on the PHY chip for connecting LEDs for status
indication and internally stretching pulses to the LEDs to make
high-speed activity visible to human eyes. In most PHYs, the
minimum duration of pulse stretching is programmable, and
in some PHYs it can even be turned off [43, Table 39]. The
contrast here with the situation we found regarding relatively
low-speed serial interfaces is stark; there, the temptation was
seemingly overwhelming for circuit designers to drive LEDs
directly from generously high voltage and high current serial
communication signals—arguably providing reliable indica-
tion of signal quality and perhaps of marginal signal levels
at very low cost. Garden variety LEDs are plenty fast enough
to reproduce amplitude-modulated signals well into the nano-
second range without any special driver circuits required.
A. High Frequency Trading (HFT)
Sometimes, security problems that you thought you had
fixed already, come back to bite you.
In the early years of this century, a new style of automatic
financial trading appeared, facilitated by the convergence of
gigabit per second networks, computers with 64-bit address
spaces, and deregulation [44]. Their trading advantage came
from the finite speed of light; by physically locating their
trading algorithms as close as possible to the exchange,
they could eke out a response time advantage measured in
milliseconds. With the margin between success and failure
so narrow, and backers willing to spend money on bespoke
hardware in return for larger profits, HFT traders pursued
ever-smaller improvements in latency and responsiveness to
changes in market conditions and requirements, culminating
in Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or Application
Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) implementation of a min-
imal gigabit Ethernet MAC, as fast as physics would allow and
additionally capable of three things that conventional Ethernet
hardware could not do:
1) ultra-low latency (µs),
2) ability to read data transmitted near the beginning of
an Ethernet packet before the entire packet had been
received, and
3) ability to cancel a speculative trade—if needed—after
the Ethernet packet had begun transmitting, but before
it had finished.5
Their systems did not have to be universally interoperable,
only compatible enough to talk to the exchange, and that only
for the few months the hardware was typically used before
being replaced by something even faster [45].
The risk in this kind of cowboy engineering is that of
Chesterton’s fence; non-obvious safeguards may be dropped,
leaving the implementation vulnerable to exploitation. While
not described in that reference (ibid.) it is not unreasonable to
speculate that HFT engineers—there were many HFT groups
besides the one in Korea—may have looked critically at the
PHY in their search for another few microseconds to harvest.
And developmental hardware, especially, sometimes needs
monitoring or diagnostic LEDs for debugging. It is purely
speculation, but there might be a ‘window’ of opportunity for
rival HFT firms with a telescope and very high speed pho-
todetector to exploit any incautiously situated LED indicators
connected directly to high-speed registers.
IV. DESIGN OF A NEW PRODUCT WITH OPTICAL
TEMPEST PRINCIPLES IN MIND
Optical TEMPEST began in a bank, took a holiday in the
Intelligence Community (IC), and now has circled back to
fintech. The remaining frontier is privacy.
Under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in
Europe, and to a lesser extent the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) in the United States,
the privacy of individuals and their personal information is
protected by law. In the U.S. at least, this makes health
care providers more risk-sensitive than they are cost-sensitive.
One particular problem—amongst many—that needs to be
solved in the U.S. arises from a quirk of the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), the main regulator of medical
diagnostic and therapeutic devices. The cost of gaining FDA
approval for use of a medical device is high, necessitating
sometimes years of clinical trials, and extensive design and
development documentation.6 As a result, perhaps millions
of vulnerable medical devices—only a few years old—exist
that never have got the required security patches for their
embedded computers’ operating system (OS) as recommended
by the OS manufacturer. The reason for the shortfall in soft-
ware maintenance is the excessive cost of FDA recertification
in the event any diagnostic- or therapeutic-relevant changes
are made to the configuration of a medical device [46]. In
5The trick was accomplished by purposely corrupting the checksum at the
end of a packet, relying upon correct behaviour of the exchange’s Ethernet
interface to discard the packet instead of processing it.
6The situation is little different in either commercial aviation or military and
intelligence community systems for classified information: process maturity,
formal or semi-formal design, and exhaustive testing before certification and
approval for use.
Figure 1. The photodiode circuit is purposely made as simple as possible
for complete transparency—the goal was not simplicity or parts count–of
implementation; the 10 kΩ pull-up resistor is for reliability together with a
100 Ω series resistor to protect the bidirectional driver (here represented by a
generic buffer) from being shorted to ground in case it were accidentally set to
output a HIGH logic level at the same time the photodiode were illuminated.
fact, the analogous situation happens in classified military
and intelligence community networks as well. Commercial
aviation experiences the problem less than either classified
networks or healthcare for two reasons: firstly, being mobile,
aviation control systems tend to be more isolated and special-
purpose embedded computers than the Commercial Off-the-
Shelf (COTS) hardware favoured by medical device and intel-
ligence community developers; and secondly, DO-178 [47].
In this section I describe some of the design considerations
for new hardware development informed by experience with
optical TEMPEST vulnerabilities and countermeasures. The
notional infosec product described is intended to isolate vul-
nerable medical devices with the aim of protecting individuals’
privacy by eliminating a potential mode of entry of hackers to
the hospital’s internal computer networks.
In a parallel universe to the HFT hardware designers in the
previous section, we use similar techniques to different ends;
the MAC here is a state machine implemented in hardware,
not for low-latency but for high-security; the PHY returns, for
security reasons—in the interest of complete transparency of
implementation—to its roots in the magnetics of IEEE 802.3i,
where the number of turns in a toroidal transformer can be
counted by hand. The design and development methodology
is that of the intelligence community, but the anticipated buyer
does not reside in the U.S., and is not expected particularly to
trust the U.S. government. The only reasonable defence against
this level of mistrust is believed to be complete openness and
transparency of design, development, and implementation.
A. Simplicity and transparency of implementation
Part of the design is essentially an optoisolator for the pur-
pose of domain separation between the ‘private’ and ‘public’
sides of the privacy problem. Integrated circuit optoisolators
can be bought but they are designed for galvanic isolation, not
infosec.
The receiver side of the optoisolator circuit is shown
schematically in Figure 1. The photodiode operates in reverse
bias (i.e., photoconductive) mode for two reasons: firstly,
speed, and secondly, simplicity of implementation. The same
photodiode operated in photovoltaic mode would be more
sensitive to very low level signals and have a lower dark
current, but would require a transimpedance amplifier for
current-to-voltage conversion, which would make the design
more complicated and thereby more difficult to evaluate for
security. There is no amplifier stage because electronics are
relatively more difficult to verify than optics. Not shown are
three additional layers of protection, implemented by passive
and active optical, mechanical, and physical means between
emitter and detector to ensure that information flows only in
one direction.
The rest of the design is equally unconventional (Figure 2).
Rather than using available ‘IP’ blocks (Intellectual Property—
pre-designed software modules delivering standard function-
ality such as ARM cores or Ethernet MAC in a chip), we
prefer a clean-room design approach built up from IEEE 802.3
standards using semi-formal methods, avoiding closed-source
IP. The result, we believe, in combination with open tests, will
be considered trustworthy by everyone in the world.
B. Energy Gap
The gold standard of information isolation is the ‘air gap’—
physically separating a system containing sensitive informa-
tion from attackers. But as Clive Robinson and others have
pointed out, in the era of wireless networking, air gapping
is insufficient.7 He coined the term ‘energy gap’ to include
both physical communication channels—RF, acoustic, optical,
thermal, magnetic, or acceleration—in addition to more ana-
logical interpretations of ‘energy’ such as the work factor re-
quired to break encryption. The design of our notional product
puts principles of physics, not algorithms or mathematics,
between the attacker and his target, in an attempt to widen the
energy gap. Optical TEMPEST risks are sealed up in machined
metal cavities; mechanical interlocks supplement logical ones.
C. Design discussion
Simplicity of implementation is paramount. There are no
amplifiers, no MAC or PHY chips, no process nodes that
cannot be de-capped and have a representative sample to be
examined under a microscope. The development tool chain
must be open source and international.
It must be acknowledged that optical TEMPEST, ironic-
ally, is a vulnerability that can be exacerbated by extreme
reliance on simplicity of implementation, as happened with
LED indicators on data communication equipment from about
1968–1998. But experience with optical TEMPEST and side
channels has inspired so many other researchers to find and
exploit diverse vulnerabilities, that the only remaining avenue
of approach is to strike as many components as possible from
the system, in the belief that a component that is not there
cannot fail, has no vulnerabilities, and lasts forever.
7Of course, Stuxnet proved that air gaps can fail in other ways, because
they must necessarily be bridged by sneakernet [48], [49].
Figure 2. Deep pipeline implementation of an Ethernet MAC; only a small portion of the pipeline is shown. The MII is clocked asynchronously by the state
machine as bits are de-marshalled efficiently into one slot each. Profligate expenditure of resources trades off for very favourable parallelism and equally
transparent computation of sizes, offsets, padding, checksum, and digital signature application and validation.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the publication in 2002 of the first peer-reviewed re-
search on compromising optical emanations, other researchers
have carried it further. But technological progress has shifted
the boundaries of what was possible, necessitating re-visit of
the same vulnerabilities from time to time. This is a general
principle of security; vulnerabilities, once fixed, sometimes do
not stay fixed.
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